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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge.  
At the center of this bankruptcy appeal is “America’s 
first sports car”: the Chevrolet Corvette.1 Joy Denby-Peterson 
purchased a Chevrolet Corvette in July 2016. Several months 
later, the Corvette was repossessed by creditors after Denby-
Peterson defaulted on her car payments. Denby-Peterson 
subsequently filed an emergency voluntary Chapter 13 
petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New 
                                                 
1 H.R. Res. 970, 110th Cong. (2008).  
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Jersey. She then notified the creditors of the bankruptcy filing 
and demanded that they return the Corvette to her. 
 
After the creditors did not comply with her demand, 
Denby-Peterson filed a motion for turnover in the Bankruptcy 
Court. She sought an order (1) compelling the creditors to 
return the Corvette to her, and (2) imposing sanctions for the 
creditors’ alleged violation of the Bankruptcy Code’s 
automatic stay.2 The Bankruptcy Court entered an order 
mandating turnover of the Corvette to Denby-Peterson but 
denying Denby-Peterson’s request for sanctions. The 
Bankruptcy Court denied the sanctions request on the basis 
that the creditors did not violate the automatic stay by failing 
to return the repossessed Corvette to Denby-Peterson upon 
receiving notice of the bankruptcy filing. Denby-Peterson 
appeals from an order of the District Court affirming the 
Bankruptcy Court. 
 
We are now presented with an issue of first impression 
for our Court: whether, upon notice of the debtor’s 
bankruptcy, a secured creditor’s failure to return collateral 
that was repossessed pre-bankruptcy petition is a violation of 
the automatic stay. We answer in the negative, and thus join 
the minority of our sister courts—the Tenth and D.C. 
Circuits—in holding that a secured creditor does not have an 
affirmative obligation under the automatic stay to return a 
debtor’s collateral to the bankruptcy estate immediately upon 
notice of the debtor’s bankruptcy because failure to return the 
collateral received pre-petition does not constitute “an[] act . . 
. to exercise control over property of the estate.”3 We will 
                                                 
2 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(3), (k). 
3 Id. § 362(a)(3). 
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therefore affirm the order of the District Court affirming the 
Bankruptcy Court.  
 
I.  
 
A. Facts 
 
On July 21, 2016, Debtor Joy Denby-Peterson 
purchased a used yellow 2008 Chevrolet Corvette from a car 
dealership named Pine Valley Motors. To finance her 
purchase, Denby-Peterson entered into a retail installment 
contract with Pine Valley Motors, which, in turn, assigned its 
rights under the contract to its affiliate company, NU2U Auto 
World.4 Under the contract, Denby-Peterson agreed to pay (1) 
a $3,000 cash down payment; (2) a deferred down payment of 
$2,491 by August 11, 2016 to pay sales taxes and registration 
fees to obtain permanent license plate tags; and (3) weekly 
installment payments of $200 for 212 weeks. Between July 
2016 and February 2017, Denby-Peterson made payments 
totaling $9,200 under the contract, including the $3,000 down 
payment applied on the day of the sale. She never made the 
required down payment of $2,491. As a result, the creditors 
repossessed the Corvette in February or March 2017.5 The 
                                                 
4 For the sake of brevity, we will collectively refer to Pine 
Valley Motors and NU2U Auto World as “the creditors.” 
5 The retail installment contract’s “repossession” clause 
states, in relevant part: “[i]f you are in default, we may take 
the vehicle from you after we give you any notice required by 
law.” Bankr. Petition No. 17-15532-ABA, Doc. No. 17-5 at 3. 
“Default,” in turn, is defined as including, among other 
things: (1) “failure to pay any installment when due”; (2) 
“failure to perform or breach of any section of th[e] contract”; 
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Corvette was never titled or registered in Denby-Peterson’s 
name. 
 
B. Bankruptcy Court Proceedings 
 
i. Denby-Peterson’s Chapter 13 Bankruptcy 
Petition 
 
After the Corvette was repossessed, Denby-Peterson 
filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 13 of the 
Bankruptcy Code on March 21, 2017. Under Section 362 of 
the Code, the filing of the petition triggered an automatic stay 
of “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of 
property from the estate or to exercise control over property 
of the estate.”6 
 
Within two days, the creditors received notice of 
Denby-Peterson’s bankruptcy filing. Counsel for Denby-
Peterson had notified them of the filing and demanded that 
they return the Corvette to Denby-Peterson. Counsel also 
maintained that the creditors’ failure to return the Corvette 
                                                                                                             
and (3) “failure to obtain and maintain the insurance required 
by th[e] contract.” Id.  
 
Before the Bankruptcy Court, the parties disputed the 
date of repossession. Denby-Peterson claimed that the 
Corvette was repossessed on March 13, 2017, while the 
creditors claimed that it was repossessed one month earlier, in 
February 2017. All parties nevertheless agree that the 
repossession occurred before Denby-Peterson filed for 
bankruptcy.  
6 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
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would result in a violation of the automatic stay. He faxed a 
letter to the creditors which stated, in relevant part:  
 
BE ADVISED your failure to release the 
vehicle to Ms. Denby-Peterson is a violation of 
the Automatic Stay. If the vehicle has not been 
released before 5pm today, this firm will seek 
damages, costs, and attorneys’ fees against your 
company for willful violations of the automatic 
stay.7 
 
The creditors did not comply with Denby-Peterson’s demand 
and thus remained in possession of the Corvette. 
 
ii. Denby-Peterson’s Motion for Turnover and 
Sanctions 
 
Denby-Peterson then filed a motion8 for turnover in 
Bankruptcy Court, asking the Bankruptcy Court to (1) order 
the creditors to return the Corvette to her, and (2) impose 
sanctions for the creditors alleged violation of the automatic 
stay. Denby-Peterson sought costs and attorneys’ fees for 
filing the motion; compensation for “non-economic 
                                                 
7 Bankr. Petition No. 17-15532-ABA, Doc. No. 5-3 at 3. See 
11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). 
8 The motion was entitled “motion for return of repossessed 
auto and seeking sanctions against creditor for violat[ing] the 
automatic stay.” Bankr. Petition No. 17-15532-ABA, Doc. 
No. 5 (original in uppercase and bold).  
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damages”; punitive damages; and “all other relief the Court 
deem[ed] just and equitable.”9 
 
The creditors opposed the motion. They also filed a 
proof of claim, asserting a security interest in the Corvette in 
the amount of $28,773.10  
 
iii. The Bankruptcy Court’s Decision 
 
Following a two-day hearing, the Bankruptcy Court 
issued a written decision and order granting the motion in part 
and denying it in part. The Bankruptcy Court, inter alia, 
granted Denby-Peterson’s request for turnover and thus 
ordered the creditors to return the Corvette to Denby-Peterson 
within seven days, but denied Denby-Peterson’s sanctions 
request. 
                                                 
9 Bankr. Petition No. 17-15532-ABA, Doc. No. 5-7 at 3. See 
11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (stating, in relevant part, that “an 
individual injured by any willful violation of a stay . . . shall 
recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, 
and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive 
damages”); see also In re Lansaw, 853 F.3d 657, 667 (3d Cir. 
2017), cert. denied sub nom. Zokaites v. Lansaw, 138 S. Ct. 
1001 (2018) (“expressly concluding that ‘actual damages’ 
under § 362(k)(1) include damages for emotional distress 
resulting from a willful violation of the automatic stay.”). 
10 The retail installment contract’s “security interest” clause 
provides that (1) Denby-Peterson gave the creditors a security 
interest in, inter alia, the Corvette, and (2) the security 
interest “cover[ed] all amounts [she] owe[d].” Bankr. Petition 
No. 17-15532-ABA, Doc. No. 17-5 at 3. 
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The Bankruptcy Court held, inter alia, that (1) the 
creditors must return the Corvette under the Bankruptcy 
Code’s turnover provision in Section 542(a),11 and (2) the 
creditors did not violate the automatic stay by retaining 
possession of the Corvette upon receiving notice of the 
bankruptcy filing. Thus, the Bankruptcy Court determined 
that the creditors were not liable for sanctions based on an 
alleged violation of the automatic stay. 
 
In reaching its holdings, the Bankruptcy Court found 
that Denby-Peterson had an equitable interest in the Corvette 
at the time of the bankruptcy filing, and therefore, the 
Corvette was property of the estate subject to turnover.12 
  
Next, the Bankruptcy Court considered whether the 
creditors violated the automatic stay by failing to return the 
Corvette after learning of the bankruptcy filing. It identified 
the split among our sister circuits on this issue, pointing out 
that the Second, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits (“the 
majority”) have held that the Bankruptcy Code’s turnover 
provision requires immediate turnover of estate property that 
was seized pre-petition and that failure to do so violates the 
                                                 
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (stating, in relevant part, that “an 
entity, other than a custodian, in possession, custody, or 
control, during the case, of property that the [debtor] may use, 
sell, or lease under section 363 of this title . . . shall deliver to 
the [debtor], and account for, such property or the value of 
such property, unless such property is of inconsequential 
value or benefit to the estate”). 
12 See id. § 541(a) (defining “property of the estate,” in 
relevant part, as “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor 
in property as of the commencement of the case”). 
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automatic stay.13 However, the Tenth and D.C. Circuits (“the 
minority”) “have instead held that a creditor does not violate 
the stay in regard to property of the estate if it merely 
maintains the status quo.”14 The Bankruptcy Court noted that 
the minority was critical of the majority’s rule that Section 
542(a)’s turnover provision “is self-effectuating” because “it 
does not allow for the possibility of defenses to turnover.”15  
 
The Bankruptcy Court ultimately adopted the minority 
position, describing it as “particularly persuasive”16 and 
pointing out that “[f]rom the inception of this case there was 
an issue regarding exactly what . . . [Denby-Peterson]’s 
interest in . . . [the Corvette] was.”17 Accordingly, the 
Bankruptcy Court concluded that the creditors did not violate 
the automatic stay by failing to turn over the Corvette to 
Denby-Peterson “prior to adjudication of . . . [her] right to 
                                                 
13 See In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019); In re 
Weber, 719 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013); In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 
F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Knaus, 889 F.2d 773 (8th 
Cir. 1989); see also In re Rozier, 376 F.3d 1323, 1324 (11th 
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that the “district court did 
not err by affirming the bankruptcy court’s order holding [the 
creditor] in willful contempt of the automatic stay . . . by 
refusing to return the vehicle”). 
14 In re Denby-Peterson, 576 B.R. 66, 80 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
2017) (citing In re Cowen, 849 F.3d 943 (10th Cir. 2017); 
United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 
1991)).  
15 Denby-Peterson, 576 B.R. at 82.  
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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redeem the [Corvette],” and thus, sanctions were not 
warranted.18  
 
C. Denby-Peterson’s Appeal to the District Court 
 
 Denby-Peterson appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s 
order denying her sanctions request. Similar to the 
Bankruptcy Court, the District Court found “the minority 
position more persuasive.”19 The District Court thus affirmed 
the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying Denby-Peterson’s 
sanctions request.20  
 
Denby-Peterson now appeals to our Court.21 Because 
the creditors are not participating in this appeal, we appointed 
                                                 
18 Id. at 83. 
19 Denby-Peterson v. Nu2u Auto World, 595 B.R. 184, 190 
(D.N.J. 2018). 
20 While Denby-Peterson’s appeal to the District Court was 
pending, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed the underlying 
bankruptcy case based on Denby-Peterson’s failure to make 
all required pre-confirmation payments to the Trustee. Before 
addressing the merits of the appeal, the District Court 
concluded that Denby-Peterson’s appeal was not mooted by 
the dismissal because the automatic-stay-related issue “is an 
ancillary issue not closely intertwined with the underlying 
bankruptcy.” Denby-Peterson, 595 B.R. at 188. 
21 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158 
(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). 
Because the District Court acted as an appellate court, we 
review its determinations de novo. In re Bocchino, 794 F.3d 
376, 379 (3d Cir. 2015). We review the legal conclusions of 
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Craig Goldblatt as amicus curiae to defend the judgment of 
the District Court.22  
II.  
 
On appeal, Denby-Peterson renews her argument that 
the creditors violated the automatic stay by not returning the 
repossessed Corvette upon learning of the bankruptcy filing. 
To provide context for the issue before us, we will discuss the 
Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay before addressing the 
merits of this appeal. 
 
Under Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, entitled 
“[a]utomatic stay,” the filing of a bankruptcy petition 
automatically triggers a stay.23 Of particular relevance to this 
appeal, subsection (a)(3) provides that a bankruptcy petition 
“operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of . . . any act to 
                                                                                                             
the Bankruptcy Court de novo and its factual determinations 
for clear error. Id. at 380.  
 
Generally, “[t]he imposition or denial of sanctions is 
subject to abuse-of-discretion review.” In re Miller, 730 F.3d 
198, 203 (3d Cir. 2013). We have not, however, addressed 
our standard of review for the imposition or denial of 
sanctions for violations of the automatic stay. We 
nevertheless need not do so now given that (1) the 
Bankruptcy Court denied sanctions based on its conclusion 
that the creditors did not violate the automatic stay, and (2) 
we now hold that both the Bankruptcy Court and the District 
Court correctly concluded that there was no such violation. 
22 We thank Mr. Goldblatt for his excellent briefing and oral 
advocacy in this matter. 
23 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
12 
 
obtain possession of property of the estate . . . or to exercise 
control over property of the estate.”24 Property of the 
bankruptcy estate, in turn, generally includes “all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case,”25 “wherever located and by 
whomever held.”26  
 
The automatic stay imposed by the Bankruptcy Code 
has a “twofold” purpose: 
 
(1) to protect the debtor, by stopping all 
collection efforts, harassment, and foreclosure 
actions, thereby giving the debtor a respite from 
creditors and a chance ‘to attempt a repayment 
or reorganization plan or simply be relieved of 
the financial pressures that drove him [or her] 
into bankruptcy;’ and (2) to protect ‘creditors 
by preventing particular creditors from acting 
unilaterally in self-interest to obtain payment 
                                                 
24 Id. § 362(a)(3). See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 340 (1977) 
(stating that “[s]ubsection (a) defines the scope of the 
automatic stay, by listing the acts that are stayed by the 
commencement of the case”). 
25 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1). 
26 Id. § 541(a). In a Chapter 13 case, such as this case, the 
concept of property of the estate is broader. See id. § 1306 
(a)(1) (providing that the Chapter 13 estate includes, in 
addition to the property specified in Section 541, property 
“that the debtor acquires after the commencement of the 
bankruptcy case” but before the case is either closed, 
dismissed, or converted).  
13 
 
from a debtor to the detriment of other 
creditors.’27 
 
In furtherance of the automatic stay’s overarching purpose, 
Section 362(a)(3) “prevent[s] dismemberment of the estate,” 
and enables an “orderly” distribution of the debtor’s assets.28  
 
 The consequences for willful violations of the 
automatic stay are set forth in Section 362(k) which provides 
that, subject to one exception, “an individual injured by any 
willful violation” of the automatic stay is entitled to “actual 
damages, including costs and attorneys’ fees, and, in 
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.”29 
We have explained that “[i]t is a willful violation of the 
automatic stay when a creditor violates the stay with 
knowledge that the bankruptcy petition has been filed. 
Willfulness does not require that the creditor intend to violate 
                                                 
27 Constitution Bank v. Tubbs, 68 F.3d 685, 691 (3d Cir. 
1995) (quoting Maritime Elec. Co. v. United Jersey Bank, 959 
F.2d 1194, 1204 (3d Cir. 1991)). See Taggart v. Lorenzen, 
139 S. Ct. 1795, 1804 (2019) (explaining that the automatic 
stay “aims to prevent damaging disruptions to the 
administration of a bankruptcy case in the short run”); Inslaw, 
932 F.2d at 1473 (“The object of the automatic stay provision 
is essentially to solve a collective action problem—to make 
sure that creditors do not destroy the bankrupt estate in their 
scramble for relief.”). 
28 H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 341. 
29 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1). See id. § 362(k)(2) (providing a 
“good faith” exception to Section 362(k)(1)). 
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the automatic stay provision, rather it requires that the acts 
which violate the stay be intentional.”30 
 
III. 
 
With the foregoing statutory background in mind, we 
now turn our attention to the issue of first impression before 
our Court: whether, upon receiving notice of a bankruptcy 
petition, a secured creditor violates the automatic stay by 
maintaining possession of collateral that it lawfully 
repossessed pre-petition. Specifically, we must decide 
whether the creditors’ failure to return the Corvette to Denby-
Peterson upon learning of her bankruptcy filing was a 
violation of the automatic stay.31 
  
As we previously acknowledged, there is a circuit split 
on this issue, which we have not yet joined. Under the 
majority position, held by the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, 
and Eleventh Circuits, a secured creditor, upon learning of the 
bankruptcy filing, must return the collateral to the debtor and 
failure to do so violates the automatic stay.32 However, both 
the Tenth and D.C. Circuits disagree with the majority’s 
                                                 
30 In re Lansdale Family Rests., Inc., 977 F.2d 826, 829 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (internal citations omitted). 
31 It is undisputed here that the creditors repossessed the 
Corvette before Denby-Peterson had filed for bankruptcy and 
that the Corvette was property of Denby-Peterson’s 
bankruptcy estate.  
32 See Fulton, 926 F.3d 916; Weber, 719 F.3d 72; Del 
Mission, 98 F.3d 1147; Knaus, 889 F.2d 773; Rozier, 376 
F.3d 1323. 
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interpretation of the automatic stay provision.33 Under their 
view, a secured creditor is not obligated to return the 
collateral to the debtor until the debtor obtains a court order 
from the Bankruptcy Court requiring the creditor to do so. 
Thus, according to the minority, a creditor does not violate 
the automatic stay by retaining possession of the collateral 
after being notified of the bankruptcy filing.  
 
Here, Denby-Peterson urges us to adopt the view of 
the majority of our sister circuits, advancing two theories in 
support of her position that the creditors violated the 
automatic stay. First, she maintains that the creditors’ failure 
to return the Corvette violated the plain language of Section 
362(a)(3)’s automatic stay provision by being “an[] act . . . to 
exercise control over property of the estate.”34 Second, 
Denby-Peterson asserts that Section 362(a)(3)’s automatic 
stay provision and Section 542(a)’s turnover provision 
operate together such that a violation of the turnover 
provision results in a violation of the automatic stay. Thus, 
according to Denby-Peterson, the creditors were required to 
immediately turn over the Corvette, and by not doing so, they 
violated the automatic stay. For the reasons that follow, we 
are not persuaded by those arguments and thus hold that the 
creditors in this case did not violate the automatic stay. In so 
holding, we join the minority of our sister circuits. 
                                                 
33 See Cowen, 849 F.3d 943; Inslaw, 932 F.2d 1467. 
34 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
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IV. 
 
A. 
 
We begin our interpretation of Section 362(a)(3) of the 
Bankruptcy Code “where all such inquiries must begin: with 
the language of the statute itself.”35  
 
In examining the Bankruptcy Code, we are not “guided 
by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the 
provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”36 
Thus, to determine the plainness or ambiguity of Section 
362(a)(3)’s statutory language, in addition to considering the 
statutory language itself, we may also engage in “a studied 
examination of the statutory context.”37 If we ultimately 
determine that a provision “is clear and unambiguous, [we] 
                                                 
35 Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 69 (2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
36 Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 369 
(3d Cir. 2004) (emphasizing that “in interpreting the 
Bankruptcy Code, the Supreme Court has been reluctant to 
declare its provisions ambiguous, preferring instead to take a 
broader, contextual view”); Official Comm. of Unsecured 
Creditors of Cybergenics Corp., ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. 
Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Statutory 
construction is a holistic endeavor, and this is especially true 
of the Bankruptcy Code.” (quotation marks, alterations and 
citations omitted)). 
37 Price, 370 F.3d at 369. 
17 
 
must simply apply it.”38 However, if we find that a provision 
is ambiguous,39 “we then turn to pre-Code practice and 
legislative history to find meaning.”40  
 
With these principles of construction in mind, we will 
now examine the language of Section 362(a)(3). To reiterate, 
Section 362(a)(3) provides, in relevant part, that the filing of 
a bankruptcy petition “operates as a stay . . . of . . . any act to . 
. . exercise control over property of the estate.”41 According 
to Denby-Peterson, under the plain language of the automatic 
stay, a creditor who does not turn over property of the estate 
after a debtor demands its return exercises control over that 
property, thereby violating the automatic stay. While we 
agree that Section 362(a)(3) is unambiguous, we decline to 
hold that a plain reading of that Section compels the 
conclusion that the creditors in this case violated the 
automatic stay by failing to turn over the Corvette to Denby-
Peterson. 
 
The operative terms and phrases of Section 362(a)(3) 
are “stay,” “act,” and “exercise control.” Because the 
                                                 
38 In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing 
Roth v. Norfalco L.L.C., 651 F.3d 367, 379 (3d Cir. 2011)). 
39 See Price, 370 F.3d at 369 (explaining that “a provision is 
ambiguous when, despite a studied examination of the 
statutory context, the natural reading of a provision remains 
elusive”). 
40 In re Friedman’s Inc., 738 F.3d 547, 554 (3d Cir. 2013). 
41 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
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Bankruptcy Code does not define them, we must look to their 
ordinary meanings.42 
  
We start with the meaning of the word “stay.” Black’s 
Law Dictionary defines “stay” as “[t]he postponement or 
halting of a proceeding, judgment, or the like” or “[a]n order 
to suspend all or part of a judicial proceeding or a judgment 
resulting from that proceeding.”43 Moreover, Webster’s Third 
New International Dictionary defines “stay” as a noun (as it 
is used in Section 362) as: (1) “a bringing to a stop,” (2) “the 
action of halting,” and (3) “the state of being stopped.”44 
 
Next, the noun “act” means, among other things, 
“[s]omething done; the action or process of achieving this.”45 
Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines “act,” in relevant 
                                                 
42 See Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 138 S. Ct. 
1752, 1759 (2018). 
43 Stay, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Black’s Law 
Dictionary further defines “automatic stay” as “[a] bar to all 
judicial and extrajudicial collection efforts against the debtor 
or the debtor’s property, subject to specific statutory 
exceptions.” Id. 
44 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2231 
(1993); see Stay, Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/189408?rskey=uCJBz6& 
result=3&isAdvanced=false (including, among its definitions 
of “stay,” “[t]he action of stopping or bringing to a stand or 
pause”) (last visited Aug. 15, 2019).  
45 Act, Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/1888?rskey=eprROF& 
result=4 (last visited Aug. 15, 2019). 
19 
 
part, as “[s]omething done or performed,” or “[t]he process of 
doing or performing.”46 
 
Finally, as to the phrase “exercise control,” we will 
separately consider the verb “exercise” and the noun 
“control.” The relevant definition of “exercise” is “[t]o put in 
action or motion.”47 Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary also defines “exercise,” in relevant part, as “to . . . 
make effective in action.”48 Additionally, “control,” as a 
noun, means, among other things, “[t]he fact or power of 
directing and regulating the actions of people or things; 
direction, management; command.”49 
 
From these definitions, we gather that Section 
362(a)(3) prohibits creditors from taking any affirmative act 
to exercise control over property of the estate. As correctly 
pointed out by the District Court, the statutory language “is 
prospective in nature . . . the exercise of control is not stayed, 
                                                 
46 Act, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
47 Exercise, Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/66089?rskey=QNVdyF& 
result=2&isAdvanced=false (last visited Aug. 15, 2019); see 
Exercise, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (describing 
“exercise” as meaning, in relevant part, “[t]o make use of; to 
put into action”). 
48 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 795. 
49 Control, Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/40562?rskey=qZlHZj& 
result=1 (last visited Aug. 15, 2019); see Control, Black’s 
Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (identifying “the power or 
authority to manage, direct, or oversee” as one of the 
definitions of “control”). 
20 
 
but the act to exercise control is stayed.”50 Therefore, we 
agree with the minority position held by two of our sister 
courts—the text of Section 362(a)(3) requires a post-petition 
affirmative act to exercise control over property of the 
estate.51 
B. 
 
Here, a post-petition affirmative act to exercise control 
over the Corvette is not present. The creditors repossessed the 
Corvette before Denby-Peterson had filed for bankruptcy. 
Accordingly, pre-bankruptcy petition, the creditors had 
possession and control of the Corvette, and post-bankruptcy 
petition, the creditors merely passively retained that same 
possession and control. Although the creditors exercised 
control over the Corvette by keeping it in their possession 
after learning of the bankruptcy filing, the requisite post-
petition affirmative “act . . . to exercise control over” the 
Corvette is not present in this case.52 An application of the 
plain language of the statute to the facts of this case thus 
shows that the creditors did not violate the automatic stay.53 
                                                 
50 Denby-Peterson, 595 B.R. at 190. 
51 See Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949 (concluding that Section 
362(a)(3) “stays entities from doing something to . . . exercise 
control over the estate’s property”); Inslaw, 932 F.2d at 1474 
(“The automatic stay, as its name suggests, serves as a 
restraint only on acts to gain possession or control over 
property of the estate.”). 
52 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
53 Denby-Peterson’s characterization of the creditors’ post-
petition behavior as a refusal to return the Corvette upon 
request does not alter our conclusion. A creditor’s refusal to 
comply with a debtor’s turnover request is not an affirmative 
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Our conclusion is bolstered by the legislative purpose 
and underlying policy goals of the automatic stay. It is well-
established that one of the automatic stay’s primary purposes 
is “‘to maintain the status quo between the debtor and [his] 
creditors, thereby affording the parties and the [Bankruptcy] 
Court an opportunity to appropriately resolve competing 
economic interests in an orderly and effective way.’”54 Here, 
the creditors had possession of the Corvette both before and 
after the bankruptcy filing. Thus, by keeping possession of 
the Corvette after learning of the bankruptcy filing, the 
creditors preserved the pre-petition status quo. To hold that 
such a retention of possession violates the automatic stay 
would directly contravene the status-quo aims of the 
automatic stay. 
 
In sum, the plain language of the automatic stay 
provision in Section 362(a)(3) and the automatic stay’s 
legislative purpose indicate that Congress did not intend 
passive retention to qualify as “an act to  . . . exercise control 
over property of the estate.”55 In light of our interpretation of 
Section 362(a)(3), we thus hold that the creditors did not 
                                                                                                             
act; rather, it is inaction. Denby-Peterson’s attempt to reframe 
creditors’ failure to act as an affirmative act is unavailing as it 
does not alter the passive nature of the creditors’ post-petition 
role in relation to the Corvette. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. 
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 555 (2012) (recognizing “the 
distinction between doing something and doing nothing”). 
54 Taylor v. Slick, 178 F.3d 698, 702 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 
Zeoli v. RIHT Mortg. Corp., 148 B.R. 698, 700 (D.N.H. 
1993)) (emphasis and alteration in original). 
55 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
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engage in a post-petition “act to . . . exercise control” over the 
Corvette and thus did not violate the automatic stay. 56 
 
C. 
 
Denby-Peterson, on the other hand, disregards the 
automatic stay’s legislative purpose and instead relies on 
Section 362(a)(3)’s scarce legislative history to support her 
position. She maintains that her “plain language reading of 
Section 362 is bolstered by the 1984 Amendments to the 
Bankruptcy Code.”57 We disagree. 
  
Given Section 362(a)(3)’s unambiguous text, we need 
not resort to legislative history to uncover its meaning.58 In 
any event, we point out that the relevant legislative history 
fails to shed light on Congress’s intent behind the 1984 
addition of the “exercise control over property of the estate” 
clause. The legislative history reveals that, as originally 
enacted in 1978, Section 362(a)(3) only stayed “any act to 
obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from 
the estate.”59 Thereafter, in 1984, Congress amended Section 
362(a)(3) by inserting the “or to exercise control over 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Appellant’s Br. at 13. 
58 See Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2016). 
59 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, § 362 
(a)(3), 92 Stat. 2549, 2570 (1978). 
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property of the estate” clause.60 Congress, however, “gave no 
explanation of its intent.”61  
 
Denby-Peterson nevertheless urges us to follow the 
Seventh Circuit’s view that “the mere fact that Congress 
expanded the provision to prohibit conduct above and beyond 
obtaining possession of an asset suggests that it intended to 
include conduct by creditors who seized an asset pre-
petition.”62 We will not do so because the legislative history 
would be pertinent only to the extent that Congress clearly 
expressed an intent to interpret Section 362(a)(3) contrary to 
its plain language. Here, Congress did not express any intent, 
much less an intent to include creditors’ passive retention of 
property that was seized pre-petition.63 Moreover, even 
                                                 
60 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 362(a)(3), 98 Stat. 333, 371 
(1984). 
61 In re Young, 193 B.R. 620, 623 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1996). 
62 Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., LLC, 566 
F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2009). See Fulton, 926 F.3d at 923 
(declining to overrule Thompson and reiterating that the 
amendment “suggested congressional intent to make the stay 
more inclusive by including conduct of ‘creditors who seized 
an asset pre-petition’” (quoting Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702)); 
see also Weber, 719 F.3d at 80 (describing the amendment as 
a “significant textual enlargement” that supports the view that 
“Congress intended to prevent creditors from retaining 
property of the debtor in derogation of the bankruptcy 
procedure . . . without regard to what party was in possession 
of the property in question when the petition was filed”). 
63 See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 
447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) (“Absent a clearly expressed 
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assuming that Section 362(a)(3) is ambiguous, thereby 
warranting consideration of legislative history, the legislative 
history’s silence provides no guidance regarding Congress’s 
rationale for adding the “or to exercise control over property 
of the estate” clause. Accordingly, the interpretation that 
Denby-Peterson urges us to adopt is unsupported by Section 
362(a)(3)’s legislative history as well as its statutory 
language. 
 
V. 
 
We now consider Denby-Peterson’s final attempt to 
overcome the plain language of Section 362(a)(3). Denby-
Peterson asserts that Section 362’s automatic stay should be 
read in conjunction with Section 542(a)’s allegedly self-
effectuating turnover provision. We are not persuaded. 
 
Under Section 542(a), creditors who are in possession 
of property of the estate must turn over such property to the 
debtor “during the [Bankruptcy] case.”64 The turnover 
provision states, in relevant part, that “an entity, other than a 
custodian,” such as a creditor,65  
                                                                                                             
legislative intention to the contrary, th[e] [statutory] language 
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”). 
64 11 U.S.C. § 542(a). In a Chapter 13 case, such as this case, 
the debtor retains control over property of the estate. See id.  
§ 1306(b). Accordingly, a Chapter 13 trustee does not take 
possession or liquidate property of the estate, except with 
respect to money collected for the purpose of making 
distributions to creditors under a plan. See id. §§ 1302, 1303. 
65 See id. § 101(10)(A). 
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in possession, custody, or control, during the 
case, of property that the [debtor] may use, sell, 
or lease under section 363 . . . , or that the 
debtor may exempt under section 522 . . . shall 
deliver to the [debtor], and account for, such 
property or the value of such property, unless 
such property is of inconsequential value or 
benefit to the estate.66  
 
Denby-Peterson contends that we should join the 
majority of our sister circuits and conclude that: (1) Section 
542(a)’s turnover provision is self-executing; (2) therefore, 
the creditors had a mandatory duty to return the Corvette to 
Denby-Peterson upon receiving notice of the bankruptcy 
filing; and (3) when the creditors rejected Denby-Peterson’s 
demand for turnover, they violated the automatic stay.67 We 
respectfully disagree with the majority. For the following 
reasons, we conclude that Denby-Peterson’s threefold 
argument is unpersuasive. 
 
A. 
 
First, in our view, Section 542(a)’s turnover provision 
is not self-executing; in other words, a creditor’s obligation to 
                                                 
66 Id. § 542(a). See id. § 1303 (providing the Chapter 13 
debtor “the rights and powers of a trustee under sections 
363(b), 363(d), 363(e), 363(f), and 363(l)”); id. § 1306(b) 
(stating, in relevant part, that “the [Chapter 13] debtor shall 
remain in possession of all property of the estate”). 
67 See Fulton, 926 F.3d 916; Weber, 719 F.3d 72; Del 
Mission, 98 F.3d 1147; Knaus, 889 F.2d 773. 
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turn over estate property to the debtor is not automatic.68 
Rather, the turnover provision requires the debtor to bring an 
adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court in order to give the 
Court the opportunity to determine whether the property is 
subject to turnover under Section 542(a).  
 
Both the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and 
the text of the turnover provision support our conclusion by 
demonstrating that the debtor’s right to turnover is subject to 
substantive and procedural requirements that must be 
evaluated by the Bankruptcy Court.69 It is only after the 
Bankruptcy Court determines whether those requirements are 
met that the debtor’s right to turnover is triggered. 
 
i. 
 
We start with the procedure behind turnover. Denby-
Peterson argues that a creditor’s duty to turn over collateral is 
automatically triggered when a creditor receives notice of the 
bankruptcy petition. In other words, procedurally, says 
                                                 
68 But see Fulton, 926 F.3d at 924 (reaffirming that Section 
362(a)(3) “becomes effective immediately upon filing the 
petition and is not dependent on the debtor first bringing a 
turnover action”); Weber, 719 F.3d at 79 (“Section 542 
requires that any entity in possession of property of the estate 
deliver it to the trustees, without condition or any further 
action: the provision is self-executing.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
69 See 4 Norton Bankr. L. & Prac. 3d § 62:3 (2019) (stating 
that “several [Bankruptcy] Code provisions play a role in 
determining whether a turnover will be ordered pursuant to 
Code § 542(a)”). 
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Denby-Peterson, all the debtor must do to initiate turnover is 
file a bankruptcy petition and notify the creditor of the filing. 
However, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(1) 
explicitly indicates otherwise. Under that Rule, the debtor 
must bring a request for turnover in an adversary proceeding 
before a Bankruptcy Court.70 Accordingly, contrary to 
Denby-Peterson’s claim, the debtor must not only file a 
bankruptcy petition, he or she must also initiate a turnover 
proceeding by (1) filing a complaint in Bankruptcy Court and 
(2) serving a creditor with a copy of the complaint.71 This 
procedural requirement negates any possibility that a 
creditor’s duty to turn over property is automatic.72 
                                                 
70 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(1) (identifying, in relevant part, 
“a proceeding to recover money or property” as an adversary 
proceeding). 
71 “An adversary proceeding is essentially a self-contained 
trial—still within the original bankruptcy case—in which a 
panoply of additional procedures apply,” In re Mansaray-
Ruffin, 530 F.3d 230, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(citing Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001-7087), including the 
requirement that a complaint must be filed to commence such 
a proceeding, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7003 (stating that Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 3 “applies in adversary 
proceedings”).  
72 Here, as noted by the Bankruptcy Court, Denby-Peterson 
did not initiate an adversary proceeding. Instead, she filed a 
motion for turnover entitled, in relevant part, “Motion for 
Return of Repossessed Auto.” Denby-Peterson, 576 B.R. at 
69. 
 
Faced with this procedural posture, the Bankruptcy 
Court concluded that the parties waived their right to an 
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ii. 
 
Moreover, the plain language of the Bankruptcy 
Code’s turnover provision also shows that the provision is not 
self-effectuating. Section 542(a) provides that only property 
of the estate, as defined in Section 541, that is either (1) 
“property that the [debtor] may use, sell, or lease under 
section 363” or (2) property “that the debtor may exempt 
under section 522,” is subject to turnover.73 The turnover 
provision also explicitly limits the right to turnover to estate 
property that (1) is in the possession, custody or control of a 
creditor, and (2) is not “of inconsequential value or benefit to 
the estate.”74 Thus, on its face, the turnover provision 
includes numerous explicit conditions that must be satisfied 
before a property is subject to turnover.  
 
In the case before us today, Denby-Peterson asks us to 
essentially ignore Section 542(a)’s statutory prerequisites and 
find that a creditor must immediately turn over any collateral 
                                                                                                             
adversary proceeding. See In re Village Mobile Homes, Inc., 
947 F.2d 1282, 1283 (5th Cir. 1991) (“Compliance with the 
requisites of an adversary proceeding may be excused by 
waiver of the parties.”). Treating the matter as a contested 
motion, the Court then addressed the merits of the turnover 
request. This difference in the procedural mechanism used to 
achieve turnover does not change our conclusion because, 
regardless of the form, a debtor must initiate a procedural 
event before the Bankruptcy Court in order for turnover to 
occur, if applicable, under the Bankruptcy Court’s 
supervision.  
73 11 U.S.C. § 542(a). 
74 Id.  
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that a debtor deems to be subject to turnover. We will not do 
so. We further note that mandating creditors to automatically 
turn over any property that the debtor deems worthy of 
turnover would allow debtors to temporarily strip creditors of 
their rights to assert affirmative defenses such as laches,75 or 
to claim that the property is not property of the estate. While 
it is true that creditors would presumably be able to assert 
these defenses in Bankruptcy Court after turning over the 
collateral to the debtor, we do not read the turnover provision 
as placing the onus on creditors to surrender the collateral and 
then immediately file a motion in Bankruptcy Court asserting 
their rights. 
 
In sum, in light of the plain language of Section 
542(a)’s turnover provision, and the procedural and 
substantive requirements underlying turnover, it would be 
illogical for us to interpret the turnover provision as imposing 
an automatic duty on creditors to turn over collateral to the 
debtor upon learning of a bankruptcy petition. We therefore 
reject Denby-Peterson’s claim that the turnover provision is 
self-effectuating.76 Instead, we conclude that the turnover 
                                                 
75 See In re Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc., 382 F.3d 325, 337 
(3d Cir. 2004); see also In re Stancil, 473 B.R. 478, 484 
(Bankr. D.D.C. 2012) (“The plain language of section 542(a) 
demonstrates that establishing inconsequential value or 
benefit to the estate is an affirmative defense to a turnover 
action.”). 
76 Denby-Peterson’s reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc. is misplaced. 462 U.S. 
198, 201 (1983). Contrary to Denby-Peterson’s claim that 
Whiting Pools implicitly supports the proposition that the 
turnover provision is self-effectuating, Whiting Pools 
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provision is effectuated by virtue of judicial action. The 
Chapter 13 debtor must first seek court intervention, such as 
through an adversary proceeding, and then the Bankruptcy 
                                                                                                             
suggests the opposite: that the turnover provision is not self-
effectuating because adequate protection can serve as a 
condition precedent before turnover. See 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) 
(providing that “property that the [debtor] may use, sell, or 
lease under section 363” may be subject to turnover); id. 
§ 363(e) (stating, in relevant part, that “the court, with or 
without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, 
or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such 
interest”); id. § 361 (providing examples of “adequate 
protection”). 
 
In Whiting Pools, the Bankruptcy Court, not the 
Chapter 11 debtor, ordered the creditor to turn over property 
to the debtor. 462 U.S. at 201. Moreover, it did so only “on 
the condition that [the Chapter 11 corporate-debtor] provide 
the [creditor] with specified [adequate] protection for its 
interests.” Id. See id. at n.7 (“Pursuant to [Section 363(e) of 
the Bankruptcy Code], the Bankruptcy Court set the 
following conditions to protect the tax lien: [the debtor] was 
to pay the [creditor] $20,000 before the turnover occurred; 
[the debtor] also was to pay $1,000 a month until the taxes 
were satisfied; the [creditor] was to retain its lien during this 
period; and if [the debtor] failed to make the payments, the 
stay was to be lifted.”). Whiting Pools thus suggests that 
turnover is required upon (1) the debtor’s filing of a motion 
for turnover, and (2) the issuance of a court order.  
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Court, not the debtor, must ultimately decide whether certain 
property must be turned over to the debtor.77 
 
B. 
 
Additionally, we point out that our interpretation of the 
turnover provision is not changed by the turnover provision’s 
use of the phrase “shall deliver to the [debtor].”78 As argued 
by Denby-Peterson, it may well be so that the word “shall” 
strongly suggests that turnover is mandatory.79 However, 
                                                 
77 We also note that under pre-Code practice, turnover was 
not viewed as self-effectuating. Before the Bankruptcy Code 
was enacted, a secured creditor, who had repossessed 
collateral pre-bankruptcy, retained possession pending the 
Bankruptcy Court’s entry of a turnover order, see Ralph 
Brubaker, Turnover, Adequate Protection, and the Automatic 
Stay (Part I): Origins and Evolution of the Turnover Power, 
33 Bankr. L. Letter No. 8, at 4-7 (Aug. 2013), and “[n]othing 
in the legislative history evinces a congressional intent to 
depart from that [pre-Code] practice.” Whiting Pools, 462 
U.S. at 208. See In re VistaCare Grp., LLC, 678 F.3d 218, 
227-28 (3d Cir. 2012) (recognizing that “courts should be 
‘reluctant to accept arguments that would interpret the Code . 
. . to effect a major change in pre-Code practice,’ absent at 
least some suggestion in the legislative history that such a 
change was intended” (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 
410, 419 (1992))). 
78 11 U.S.C. § 542(a).  
79 See Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001) (“The 
word ‘shall’ is ordinarily the language of command.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Dessouki v. Att’y Gen. of United 
States, 915 F.3d 964, 966 (3d Cir. 2019) (recognizing that 
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turnover is mandatory only in the context of an adversary 
proceeding presided over by the Bankruptcy Court. Under 
Rule 7001(1), the debtor must bring an adversary proceeding 
seeking turnover. True, the turnover provision states: “shall 
deliver,” but the question before us is when must a creditor 
deliver? The answer is when the Bankruptcy Court says so in 
the context of an adversary proceeding brought under Rule 
7001(1). We view the statutory and procedural framework as: 
(1) the Chapter 13 debtor must seek court relief, such as by 
initiating an adversary proceeding requesting turnover; (2) the 
Bankruptcy Court then determines whether the property is 
subject to turnover; and (3) if it is, in accordance with that 
determination, the Bankruptcy Court issues a court order 
compelling a creditor to turn over property to the debtor. 
   
 Our conclusion is further supported by the United 
States Supreme Court’s reasoning in Citizens Bank of 
Maryland v. Strumpf.80 In that case, the Court considered the 
interplay between the automatic stay81 and the turnover 
provision in Section 542(b). Notably, notwithstanding the 
                                                                                                             
“the word ‘shall’ imposes a mandatory requirement”); see 
also Shall, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining 
“shall,” in relevant part, as “[h]as a duty to; more broadly, is 
required to,” and characterizing that usage as “the mandatory 
sense that drafters typically intend and that courts typically 
uphold”). 
80 516 U.S. 16 (1995).  
81 As relevant to Strumpf, the filing of a bankruptcy petition 
stays “the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose 
before the commencement of the [bankruptcy] case . . . 
against any claim against the debtor.” 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7). 
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word “shall” in that turnover provision, the Strumpf Court did 
not interpret the provision as self-executing. 
  
 Section 542(b)’s turnover provision states: “an entity 
that owes a debt that is property of the estate . . . shall pay 
such debt to . . . the trustee.”82 However, an entity is excused 
from that obligation “to the extent that such debt may be 
offset under section 553 . . . against a claim against the 
debtor.”83 Thus, similar to the turnover provision at issue in 
this case, the turnover provision in subsection (b) includes the 
word “shall” as well as a defense to turnover.  
 
 In Strumpf, the Supreme Court held that a bank’s 
temporary withholding of funds in a debtor’s bank account, 
pending resolution of the bank’s setoff right,84 did not violate 
the automatic stay. In reaching that holding, the Court 
reasoned, among other things, that interpreting Section 
542(b)’s turnover provision as self-executing would 
“eviscerate” the provision’s exceptions to the duty to pay.85 
Here, we likewise decline to interpret Section 542(a)’s “shall 
deliver” clause in a way that would disregard the provision’s 
explicit defenses.86 
                                                 
82 Id. § 542(b) (emphasis added). 
83 Id. 
84 See Strumpf, 516 U.S. at 19 (“Petitioner refused to pay its 
debt, not permanently and absolutely, but only while it sought 
relief under § 362(d) from the automatic stay.”). 
85 Id. at 20.   
86 See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005) 
(“[W]hen Congress uses the same language in two statutes 
having similar purposes . . . it is appropriate to presume that 
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C. 
 
 Even assuming the turnover provision is self-
executing, as pointed out by the Tenth Circuit, “there is still 
no textual link between [Section] 542 and [Section] 362.”87 
The language of the automatic stay provision and the turnover 
provision do not refer to each other. The absence of an 
express textual link between the two provisions indicates that 
they should not be read together, so violation of the turnover 
provision would not warrant sanctions for violation of the 
automatic stay provision. 
 
VI. 
 
 Guided by the plain language of the Bankruptcy 
Code’s automatic stay and turnover provisions, the legislative 
purpose and policy goals of the automatic stay, and the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court and our two sister circuits, 
we hold that a creditor in possession of collateral that was 
repossessed before a bankruptcy filing does not violate the 
automatic stay by retaining the collateral post-bankruptcy 
petition. 
 
We will thus affirm the order of the District Court 
affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s order denying Denby-
Peterson’s request for sanctions. 
                                                                                                             
Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both 
statutes.”). 
87 Cowen, 849 F.3d at 950. 
